MORE TROOPS TO IRAQ?

A “surge” of U. S. troops to Iraq seems to be a distinct possibility. The numbers being bandied about are in the 25,000 to 30,000 range. An official rationale has not yet been provided, but the general, ephemeral idea is probably that more troops will reduce the overall level of chaos. Maybe. Or maybe it’s a case of a day late and a dollar short. Or maybe by this stage it’s just plain too late and any number of U.S. troops short of the 500,000 who should have been sent initially won’t, in the long term, make a difference.

Here are some facts about the U.S. involvement in Iraq. First, at some point in the not-too-distance future we are going to leave. It may be three years, it may be five years, it may be ten years or longer. But we ain’t staying permanently. They don’t want us there, and the American people don’t have the patience to be long-term occupiers.

Second, there will be no “victory” in Iraq in the classic sense: no surrender by the opposing forces, no wiping out of all opposition by us, no victory parade down 5th Avenue by triumphant returning troops. At best there would be a semblance of stability, most likely imposed by an authoritarian government whose human rights record will be dismal. The chances of this “best” scenario coming about are slim.

Third, to counter the nonstate forces that would do us harm in this world, we need to be one helluva lot smarter than we have been over the last few years. We have sought to meet the threat posed by a relatively small number of nihilistic terrorists by waging a conventional war. A major consequence seems to have been the creation of a lot more potential and actual terrorists. We have come to be viewed by much of the world as a lumbering ineffectual bully and are being treated accordingly.

Fourth, the nation of Iraq is a relative new concept. The nation was created by some mid-level British and French diplomats after World War I. The three distinct groups in Iraq—Kurds, Sunnis, and Shites—share one thing: a distinct dislike of one another. Why try to hold together these three ancient adversaries?

From the United States’ viewpoint, the major problem—other than George W. Bush’s pride and stubbornness—is summarized by former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s observation that if we break the pottery, it becomes ours. Well, we broke it. So now what?

Well, here is one solution from the peanut gallery. First, stop yaking about victory, accomplishing the mission, bringing freedom to the people of Iraq, and the like. Second, accept the fact that Iraq is really three distinct “nations.” If they can manage to live together under a federal umbrella of some sort, fine. But stop trying to mix oil and water. (Not a very good metaphor or analogy, but you get the picture.) Instead of trying to create an Iraqi army, an Iraqi police force, an Iraqi government, let the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shites each create their own. If in doing so the various sides feel they have to pound the crap out of each other every now and then, fine. Let them get it out of their systems.

Third, pull U.S. troops back to a few isolated bases. The near term mission would be to, when the fighting between the factions gets excessively rough, emerge and pummel the participants a bit. The long-term mission—18 months or so—would be get all U.S. troops out of the country.

Finally, in 2008 elect a U.S. President who does not believe the neoconservative notion that bringing democracy and freedom to the world is a task easily accomplished with just a modest expenditure of resources and the appearance of a few U.S. soldiers. In short, elect a President whose idealism is tempered by reality, who is not the slave of an ideology, any ideology, right or left. Core values are one thing. Trying to ram your view of the world down the world's throat is another.

DSH