America’s involvement in Iraq today and in Vietnam four or so decades ago have similarities, principal ones being the misjudgments and even incompetence of the advisors and decision-makers in the White House and in the upper levels of the Defense Department. But do those similarities mandate that the outcome in Iraq will be similar to the outcome in Vietnam?
No. Significant differences exist between the two situations, differences that will likely override the common characteristic of high-level ineptness. Although in both situations America and its local ally faced an insurgency, in Vietnam they also faced a regular, main-force army, the North Vietnamese Army. That army was the ultimate victor, and then only because, after fifteen or so years of conflict, America got tired, picked up its marbles, and went home. Indeed, in Vietnam, the insurgency was, by the early 1970s, a relatively minor annoyance, just a shadow of what it had been.
In Iraq, America faces no main-force army. Its foes are an insurgency and, on a wider scope, an anti-modern, nihilistic, Islamic radicalism. America’s task is complicated by its own less-than-impressive leadership, but the quality of its soldiers and diplomats on the ground may prove sufficient to offset the ineptness from above. If America were to pick up its marbles and go home, as it did in Vietnam, no modern military force is standing in the wings to fill the vacuum.
What is standing in the wings is most likely chaos. But a degree of chaos has been and is likely to remain a part of the Middle Eastern scene no matter what America does. Thus the challenge facing America is to find strategies that mitigate the chaos, that further the struggle against the real foe—which is anti-modern, nihilistic, Islamic radicalism—and that produce in Iraq itself a modicum of stability garnished with sprigs of democracy and tolerance. An ingredient of such strategies is certainly a lower profile in Iraq and a willingness to let Iraqis work out there own future, which may involve a dissolution into two or more semi-hostile semi-nations.
DSH
Friday, November 25, 2005
Thursday, November 17, 2005
IRAQ AND VIETNAM
Comparisons between America’s involvement in Iraq today and America’s involvement in Vietnam four decades or so ago (has it really been that long?) are popular. Some of the comparisons are compelling, others strained. Here are three that are compelling, at least to this cranky old guy.
First, in both instances the United States attempted to control a far corner of the planet with a relatively small number of troops. Superior technology was supposed to offset the lack of manpower. It ultimately didn’t in Vietnam, and the experience thus far in Iraq has not met the initial optimistic expectations of those at the top of the command structure.
Which leads to the second similarity between the two conflicts: the top of the command structure, specifically the policy makers and implementers in the White Houses and upper reaches of the Defense Departments of Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush. In both instances, those recommending and making policy seemed guided as much by hope for a successful outcome as by realistic, in-depth, hard-eyed, historically knowledgeable calculations of the likely costs and potential benefits. In both instances, the Department of Defense was led by a successful titan of the corporate world, an arrogant, number-crunching, efficiency expert who proved to have little understanding of the messy, nasty, brutal, dehumanizing nature of war.
And for the third similarity, in neither instance was there a universal belief that the nation was fighting for its immediate survival, as in World War II. Thus the national leadership was, and is, in a weak position to defend setbacks, apparent lack of progress, and misjudgments and mistakes that cost the lives of American soldiers. In the dark early days of World War II, Winston Churchill rallied the British people with words such as:
We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender. . . .
And on another occasion:
[T]he Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. . . . Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duty, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say: “This was their finest hour.”
The limited nature of their wars and the disagreements about the necessity of those wars to the survival of the nation precluded Presidents Johnson or Bush from such stirring appeals, even assuming such appeals were within their capabilities, or more accurately the capabilities of their speechwriters. Instead, rather than talking bluntly to the American people about the conflicts, rather than admitting setbacks and mistakes, all too often the motivational messages from the Johnson and Bush White Houses were, and are, when not outright distortions, little more than pabulum, centered on such phrases as “the light at the end of the tunnel,” we are “making progress,” we must “stay the course,” and the insurgency is in its “last throes.” Moreover, the messages were then and are now based on dubious domino theories: if we don’t stop the commies in Vietnam, all Southeast Asia will fall under the hammer and sickle; if we don’t stop the terrorists in Iraq, all Islam will fall under their sway.
Here endth the lesson.
DSH
First, in both instances the United States attempted to control a far corner of the planet with a relatively small number of troops. Superior technology was supposed to offset the lack of manpower. It ultimately didn’t in Vietnam, and the experience thus far in Iraq has not met the initial optimistic expectations of those at the top of the command structure.
Which leads to the second similarity between the two conflicts: the top of the command structure, specifically the policy makers and implementers in the White Houses and upper reaches of the Defense Departments of Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush. In both instances, those recommending and making policy seemed guided as much by hope for a successful outcome as by realistic, in-depth, hard-eyed, historically knowledgeable calculations of the likely costs and potential benefits. In both instances, the Department of Defense was led by a successful titan of the corporate world, an arrogant, number-crunching, efficiency expert who proved to have little understanding of the messy, nasty, brutal, dehumanizing nature of war.
And for the third similarity, in neither instance was there a universal belief that the nation was fighting for its immediate survival, as in World War II. Thus the national leadership was, and is, in a weak position to defend setbacks, apparent lack of progress, and misjudgments and mistakes that cost the lives of American soldiers. In the dark early days of World War II, Winston Churchill rallied the British people with words such as:
We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender. . . .
And on another occasion:
[T]he Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. . . . Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duty, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say: “This was their finest hour.”
The limited nature of their wars and the disagreements about the necessity of those wars to the survival of the nation precluded Presidents Johnson or Bush from such stirring appeals, even assuming such appeals were within their capabilities, or more accurately the capabilities of their speechwriters. Instead, rather than talking bluntly to the American people about the conflicts, rather than admitting setbacks and mistakes, all too often the motivational messages from the Johnson and Bush White Houses were, and are, when not outright distortions, little more than pabulum, centered on such phrases as “the light at the end of the tunnel,” we are “making progress,” we must “stay the course,” and the insurgency is in its “last throes.” Moreover, the messages were then and are now based on dubious domino theories: if we don’t stop the commies in Vietnam, all Southeast Asia will fall under the hammer and sickle; if we don’t stop the terrorists in Iraq, all Islam will fall under their sway.
Here endth the lesson.
DSH
Monday, November 07, 2005
VOTING
Over the past few days, the Cranky Old Guy has told the following individuals to, in the immortal words of David Letterman, “Bite Me”: President George W. Bush, Senator George Allen; Congressman Tom Davis; some carpet-bagging Yankee name of Rudy Giuliani, and Sheriff Jim Dunning.
The encounters were not as satisfying as might be expected, however. The individuals had no reaction to the request. Indeed, each kept right on talking in what turned out to be a completely one-sided telephone conversation. Could it be that the Cranky Old Guy was not receiving a call from a real live person?
Really, is this sort of political advertising effective? In the Cranky Old Guy’s world, voting in response to a taped telephone conversation would be grounds for having one’s vote discounted. Voting in two different elections in response to taped calls would put you in the ranks of felons: you loose the right to vote. You are below the lowest common denominator.
Other actions that should result in a loss of the right to vote:
You actually belief a politician’s campaign promises.
You shake a candidate’s hand and get giddy.
You base your vote on lapel pins.
Negative political advertising makes you feel good.
You don’t think there is such a thing as negative political advertising.
dsh
The encounters were not as satisfying as might be expected, however. The individuals had no reaction to the request. Indeed, each kept right on talking in what turned out to be a completely one-sided telephone conversation. Could it be that the Cranky Old Guy was not receiving a call from a real live person?
Really, is this sort of political advertising effective? In the Cranky Old Guy’s world, voting in response to a taped telephone conversation would be grounds for having one’s vote discounted. Voting in two different elections in response to taped calls would put you in the ranks of felons: you loose the right to vote. You are below the lowest common denominator.
Other actions that should result in a loss of the right to vote:
You actually belief a politician’s campaign promises.
You shake a candidate’s hand and get giddy.
You base your vote on lapel pins.
Negative political advertising makes you feel good.
You don’t think there is such a thing as negative political advertising.
dsh
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)